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SENTENCING:
the dilemma of discretion
by Jerold Israel
Professor of Law
The University of Michigan
[The following excerpts are taken from Professor Jerold
Israel 's revision of the late Hazel B. Kerper's In trod uction
to the Crim ina l Ju sti ce Sys tem (West Publishing Co . 1979) .
This book is a widel y used beginning text for
undergraduates . It concentrates on presenting a broad
overview of the basic features of the criminal justice
process . This is Professor Israel 's first experience writing
for undergraduates , and he reports that it is "far more
difficult , in many ways" than traditional law review
writing. Since sentencing reform is a major topi c of concern
toda y, we thought this excerpt might prove of interest lo
those of our readers who ma y have onl y a passing
familiarit y with the current controversy. Footnotes ha ve
been deleted .]
As we h ave seen , judges us u a lly h ave sub stantial
disc re ti o n in se nte n cing. Mos t sta tes give th e m co nsiderab le
leeway in choos ing between proba ti on a nd im priso nm e nt,
i n se tting th e te rm of im p r iso nm e nt und e r e ith e r an
in de te rmin ate or d e te rmin ate se nt enci ng s tru c ture, in
decid ing wh e th e r a you ng offe n der wi ll be give n the specia l
b e n e fi ts of a you thf u l off e nder s tatu te, and in de termi n ing
wh e th er to imp ose co nsecut ive or co n curre nt sente n ces for
m ul ti p le co n victions.

In some jurisdic tions, judges even h ave th e fina l say as to
w h eth er an extended te rm w ill be im posed under a
h abitual offender charge . Judicia l discre tion in sentencing
is one of th e most hot ly debated subjects in th e crimi n a l
justice field today. Few experts are satisfied with the
present system, but there is a sharp division among the
cri tics as to what refo rm s are needed. Some argue that
extensive judicial d iscretion is basica ll y correct, but minor
m od ifi catio n s wou ld be valuable so as to more carefully
co n trol th e exercise of th a t d isc retio n . Others a rgue that th e
d isc retio n m ust be take n away from th e judges and either
p laced e lsewh e re or la rge ly el iminated from th e sentencing
process .
To full y appreciate the issues in th is crucial debate. one
m ust have so m e answers to at least th ree questions . Why
did we give judges extensive sentencing discretion in the
first place? Wh a t have been the advantages and
disadvantages of jud icial d iscretion ? W h at alternatives are
available , and wha t are their advantages a nd
disadva n tages? After le ngthy discussions , experts remain in
d isagreeme n t as to th e appropriate responses to these
questions. We w ill attempt mere ly to summarize some of
th e more substantial points they have made .
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e noted in Chapter Five that the movement toward
indeterminate sentences (and judicial discretion) reflected
an interest in accom modating the several objectives of
punishment. Indeterminate sentencing was designed to
achieve rehabilitation as well as deterrence, to avoid
needless incapacitation while still obtaining a punishment
sufficient to serve the legitimate needs of retribution. The
development of probation reflected these same concerns,
although the primary emphasis here clearly was on
rehabilitation. The overall objective of our sentencing
philosoph was to make the punishment fit the offender as
well as the offense. This was an objective that required
individualized sentencing based upon the facts of the
individual case. It was an objective that lent itself naturally
to broad judicial discretion .
There are those today who contend that our emphasis on
rehabilitation has been misplaced-not because it is an
inappropriate goal, but because it remains largely beyond
our capacit . Yet even if this controversial premise is
accepted, the need for individualized sentencing hardly
disappears. If one looks to incapacitation, deterrence , or
even retribution , there is still need for individualization .
Let us consider, for example, five cases of kidnapping.
o. 1 is a woman whose baby died, and who took another
woman's bab y from the hospital. No. 2 is a young man
whose girl-friend said she was breaking up with him . He
put her in a car and drove her around for 24 hours trying to
persuade her to change her mind, while her frantic parents
tried to locate them and the girl did everything she could to
get awa . No. 3 is a divorced man who took his own child
from its mother who had legal custody and refused to tell
the mother where the child was. No. 4 is a kidnapper for
ransom who kept a young woman buried in a box fitted with
air tubes for breathing in order to make it impossible for
searchers to find her, and who demanded $200,000 from her
wealthy father . No. 5 is a woman accomplice of the
kidnapper for ransom. She assisted in the kidnapping
because she was in love with the kidnapper and was also
threatened b him . She did everything she could to keep the
kidnapped girl alive when it was possible for her to do so.

The offense charged in each of our five cases is
identical-kidnapping. The legislature has drawn some
general distinctions in defining that crime, but it can hardly
take into consideration all of the factors that distinguish one
kidnapping from another and one person's participation
from that of his accomplice. Even if one were concerned
onl with retribution, somebody must be given authority to
disti nguish between these five cases. The evil in each is
hardly eq uiva lent to the others even though the same crime
is involved. A sanction as severe as imprisonment should
not be imposed without drawing more careful lines that
relate to our re tribution objective. Of course, once we add
consideration of deterrence and some degree of
rehabilitation, we must consider more factors and there is
e en greater need for individualization. In sum,
individualization probably would not be as essential if we
had fewer punishment objectives and they did not so
frequent! clash, but even if we shifted our focus so that
deterrence or retribution became the dominant theme-as
some say we should-a certain amount of individualization
(and hence discretion) wou ld still be n eeded .
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Factors

ffecting Judicial Discretion

How in fact have judges utilized the discretion they have
recei ed? Have they emphasized factors that relate to the
several goals of punishment? Most experts believe that they
have done so, although many would say that there has been
too much emphasis on one factor or another. While the
weight given to particular factors varies with the judge,
almost all judges have tended to look to the same basic
elements. The first , and probably the most significant, is the
seriousness of the offense as it was carried out. As we saw
in our five kidnapping cases, the gravity of the actor's
wrongdoing is not always revealed simply by the
punishment category in which the legislature places the
particular crime. A sentencing court will want to know if
the case involved special aggravating circumstances that
made the defendant's conduct more serious than that of
other offenders who commit the same crime. Though a
violent act is not a formal element of the crime charged, did
the defendant here actually threaten harm to his victim?
Did he involve minors in the commission of the crime? Did
he pick upon a victim who was particularly vulnerable? Did
the planning, sophistication or professionalism of the crime
indicate premeditation? On the other side, the court also
will want to know if the case involved special mitigating
factors that suggest a lower sentence: the defendant may
have been a passive participant or may have played a minor
role in committing the crime; the defendant may have
exercised special caution to avoid harming the victim; the
defendant may have acted under the influence of alcohol or
extreme emotional stress; or the victim may have been an
initiator or provoker of the incident. Our list of mitigating
and aggravating factors is not complete, but only
illustrative. As we have noted, several of the recently
adopted determinate sentencing provisions include lists of
specific aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered
by the judge.
Judges also will look to the character and background of
the defendant. Has he been convicted of previous offenses?
Has he "served time'' before? Has he engaged in a pattern
of violent conduct which suggests that he poses a serious
danger to society? What is his attitude towards this crimehas he plead guilty, made restitution to the victim, assisted
the police in convicting his accomplices? Does he have
social stability indicating that he may be able to stay out of
trouble? Relevant factors here include his family ties,
employment record, possible addiction to drugs, and the
character of his friends and associates . Many judges are
concerned that such factors tend to discriminate among
socio-economic classes, favoring in particular the
defendant from a middle-class community . However,
available evidence suggests that such offenders are less
likely to repeat certain types of offenses (e.g., burglaries)
than other prisoners who have far less to look forward to
when they are returned to the community.
Another factor likely to influence the judge is the
community attitude toward the crime and the offender. If
there is special community fear of the particular type of
crime, or outrage as to the particular case before the court,
the judge may feel that the community's demand for
retribution or deterrence should be reflected in his
sentence. Reviewing a sentence of two years imprisonment
and five years suspended sentence for two counts of
forcible rape , the Supreme Court of Alaska rejected that
sentence because it failed to give sufficient weight to
"community condemnation of the offender's anti-social
conduct." The trial court had relied primarily upon the
def end ant's potential for rehabilitation, but the Alaska

Supreme Court stressed that that interest did not justify
ignoring the need for "the reaffirmation of societal norms,
for the purpose of maintaining respect for the norms." In
light of that need, the sentence was too lenient: "A
substantially longer period of actual confinement was
called for ... [so as to] bring home to[the defendant] the
serious nature and consequences of his crime and to
reaffirm society's condemnation of violent and forcible
rape ."
The judge's exercise of discretion in sentencing also is
likely to be influenced by his perspective of the state's
corrections system. The nature of prison life and prison
programs may be a deciding factor in choosing between
probation or imprisonment or in setting the term of
imprisonment. When there still is some hope for
rehabilitation, and the judge views the prison system as
almost inevitably having a negative impact on an offender,
the judge is more likely to turn to probation. Where the
judge has decided on imprisonment, the conditions under
which time will be served may influence his determination
as to the appropriate minimum term. Life in an antiquated,
maximum security prison obviously is somewhat different
than life in a modern, minimum security institution. The
judge may be impressed (or depressed) by the prison
system's rehabilitative programs. Where he has some
confidence in those programs, he may hesitate to impose a
high minimum for fear that it will interfere with the parole
of the prisoner at that point when he is most likely to
achieve a successful return to the community. Judges are
aware that holding a prisoner beyond that point may be
counterproductive. It can lead to bitterness and a
reinforcement of the attitudes which led the offender to
prison in the first place. On the other hand, if the judge
believes that the corrections system offers little hope of
rehabilitation or that the parole board takes too many
unjustifiable risks, he may be inclined to impose a higher
minimum sentence.
Judges also take into consideration the impact of the
sentence upon the administration of an overburdened
criminal justice system. They recognize that if concessions
are not given for guilty pleas, the backlog of cases to be tried
may grow so heavy as to almost cause the system to
collapse. They also recognize that, where prisons are
overcrowded and new prisons are not being built, the
parole board may be in a position where it is forced to
release a prisoner for every new prisoner it receives . In
such situations, high maximum terms are meaningless .
Prisoners will be released long before their full terms are
served (even without consideration of liberal good time
allowances). Indeed, a high minimum may be unwise even
though the judge is confident that this offender should be
incapacitated for a substantial period of time. The judge has
no way of comparing this offender to others that the parole
board also must consider for possible release. Assuming
that overcrowding will require the parole board to release
some prisoners who are far from good risks, the judge may
hesitate to tie the board's hands with a high minimum,
thereby possibly forcing it to take an even greater risk in
paroling a less deserving prisoner.

Improper Factors

While judges are divided as to the weight that should be
given to some factors (e.g., a guilty plea). all agree that
certain factors should not be considered. A sentence clearly
should not be based on the race , sex, or the social status of

the offender. Yet we frequently hear of studies that
supposedly show that sentences are strongly influenced by
these clearly irrelevant factors . One particularly disturbing
study presented by counsel in the Supreme Court's death
penalty cases pointed out that the capital punishment was
more often imposed on black defendants than white
defendants . Other studies, however, suggest that if all other
factors are kept constant, race and sex have little if any
significant impact on sentencing . .. . A major difficulty
presented in evaluating available data is that race and sex
can be determined from a surface analysis, but underlying
factors that may provide alternative explanations often are
found only in confidential presentence reports.

Disparity In Sentencing

A major complaint leveled against judicial discretion in
sentencing is that it produces "sentencing disparity."
Unfortunately, the label "sentencing disparity" is used in
many different ways . If it refers simply to different
sentences for persons convicted of the same crime, then it is
not necessarily an evil. A prisoner who receives a higher
sentence than a fell ow prisoner convicted of the same crime
quite naturally complains that the system is not "fair."
Fairness , however, must be judged in light of the proper
objectives of sentencing. The prisoner's higher sentence
may be the product of a variety of factors relevant to those
objectives, such as his extraordinary violence in the
commission of the crime or his long criminal record .
Disparity justified by such factors is not a cause of concern,
although further efforts may be needed to educate the
public as to the reasons for its existence .
Disparity due to sentencing based on irrelevant factors is ,
on the other hand, an evil that should be eliminated. We
already have noted the disagreement as to the existence of
disparities based on race, sex, or social status . Many argue
that such disparities have not yet been shown to be a major
problem. There is general agreement, however, that
another form of unfortunate disparity does exist-namely
sentencing disparities produced by the differences in the
sentencing philosophies of individual judges. Different
judges will take different views of the gravity of the same
crime . One judge may abhor narcotic violations and "come
down hard" on all narcotics offenders. Another may view
narcotics users as victims of the "pushers" and reserve
harsh sentences for major dealers . Judges also differ as to
the weight to be given to particular sentencing objectives .
One judge may emphasize the possibilities of
rehabilitation, while another may be concerned primarily
with making the offender "pay his debt to society." Thus,
the individual judge's value judgments obviously play some
role in sentencing. We are uncertain, however, as to how
greatly sentences are influenced by these variations among
judges. Are we talking about an occasional disparity
produced by the idiosyncratic views of a "hanging judge" or
is this an everyday problem influencing sentences in many
cases?
Sentencing institutes held throughout the country suggest
that differences in judicial philosophies may have an
impact in a significant number of sentencing decisions . At
these institutes, various trial judges are given hypothetical
cases and asked to indicate what sentence they would
impose . They have not seen the defendant, of course, but
they are given a fairly complete picture of the offense plus
all of the information as to the defendant's background that
would be available in the ordinary case (age, prior record ,
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drug u se . edu ca ti on. etc.). While the proposed sentences do
te nd to cluste r a t ce rtain points. th ey also disclose
co nsi de ra bl e disparity be tween som e judges. For example.
in one ba nk robb e ry case presented to 48 federal district
judg es. th e ave rag e maximum term proposed was slightly
ove r te n years, but the responses of individual judges
r a nge d from fi ve to e ighteen years . In a hypothetical heroin
possession cas e considered by the same group of judges,
36% wo uld have granted probation , while the remainder
wo uld ha ve imposed incarceration ranging from three
month s to th e statutor y maximum of two years. After
pa rti ci pating in such institutes and noting the different
ap proach es of his colleagues in sentencing, one federal
judge conclude d : " IO]ur laws characteristically leave to the
se nt e ncing judge a range of choice that should be
u nthinkabl e in 'a government of law, not of men .'"

-\lternath es . Assisting Judges
How should imprope r disparity in sentencing be
e liminat ed ? Some commentators argue that judicial
discre tion is a basically sound idea requiring only minor
modifications to eliminate the more extreme disparities.
They suggest the use of sentencing guidelines, more
se nt e ncing institutes where judges share ideas, and
stronger appellate review of sentences. Such programs,
th ey argu e, will produce greater uniformity without
eliminating the opportunity for individualizing sentences.
As th ey see it. the primary need is to increase
communications among judges and between judges and the
correc tiorial syst e m.
On e of th e more innovative programs for increasing the
information share d by judges utilizes statistical analysis of
se nten ces curr e ntly imposed by judges . Sentences are
a nal yze d in light of a series of variables to determine the
w e ight being given to each. Then the key variables are
a rra ng ed on a grid that produces a series of different
se nte ncing categories for each offense . Looking to the
vari a bl e s in th e case before him. which include such factors
as th e offe nder 's e ducational level and age at the time of
his first con viction . the judge can place the case in a
pa rticul a r category. which will tell him what sentence
co mmon! is given to this type of defendant in this type of
case . Whil e current guideline programs do not go far. some
co mm e ntators a rgue that there should be a presumption
aga in s t se nt e n ces outside the guidelines. If the judge should
im pose a se nte nce that does not fit within the guidelines, he
wo uld be re quire d to state his reasons for deviating from
th e guid e lin e s and his de cision would then be subject to
care ful a pp e llat e r e view . A major criticism of this proposal
is tha t it might le ad to " robot sentencing." Judges could
beco m e so h esi ta nt to go outside the guidelines that they
m igh t se n te n ce without regard to the unique circumstances
of in di vid ua l ca ses.

Alternatives: Parole Boards and Sentencing Commissions
So me cr it ics of judi cia l di scre tion contend that the
suggested modifi ca tio ns. even if the y could produce greater
uniform ity . wou ld no t be sa ti s fac tor y. The problem , as they
see it. is that the modifi ca ti ons onl y would produce more
consiste nt ad he re nce to e nt e ncing policies that reflect a
consensu judgme n t of th e judi cia ry. These critics share the
doubts. e xp ressed by ma n y judges th e mse lves , as to
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whether judges are well equipped to set sentencing
policies . They agree with Justice Frankfurter, who once
noted :
We lawyers who be come judges ... are not very competent , are not
qualifi e d b y experi e nce. to impose sentences where any discretion
is to be e xercised. I do not think it is in the domain of the training of
lawyers to know what to do with a fellow after you find out he is a
thief. I do not think legal training gives you any special
competence .

Assuming one accepts this view. the question arises as to
who should be the recipient of the discretion currently
given to judges. The two most common suggestions are the
parole board and a special sentencing commission .
At one time. most opponents of judicial discretion argued
that more authority should be granted to the parole board.
The ideal, as they saw it , was a system under which there
was no minimum sentence and the maximum was set by
statute . The key was to provide as much indeterminancy as
possible so as to increase parole board discretion . The
advantages of parole board sentencing supposedly were :
(1) parole boards are centralized agencies and thus more
likely to provide statewide uniformity of treatment of
similar cases; (2) the parole board could be staffed with
experts on human behavior; (3) parole boards are more
likely to use a scientific approach in sentencing,
considering many variables; and (4) parole board
sentencing might decrease the control that prosecutors
exercise over the sentencing process through plea
bargaining. Of course. even if parole board sentencing
provided a successful alternative to judicial discretion in
setting the term of imprisonment, it did not furnish a
complete solution for those opposed to judicial discretion .
The judge still would retain discretion over the issue as to
whether or not to grant probation since a parole board deals
only with imprisonment.
Broadened parole board discretion was promoted in
many states until the mid-1960's . Then, the tide seemed to
turn . Today. as we saw in our discussion of determinate
sentencing, there probably is more opposition to parole
board discretion than to judicial discretion. The complaints
against parole board discretion are many. but the most
significant is that parole boards tend to emphasize the
wrong factors in determining whether a prisoner should be
released . They place too little emphasis on the nature of the
crime. it is argued , and too much emphasis on how well the
defender has done in prison. The latter factor. critics
suggest , has little predictive value . Prisoners participate in
"rehabilitative" programs in prison because they know they
must do so to obtain their early release. Prisons are, in
effect. drama schools that force persons to act as if they
were rehabilitated according to our stereotyped views of
proper behavior. Moreover, the critics continue. it is
questionable whether prisoner behavior is a good predictor
of community behavior in any event. Professor Hans
Mattick once noted. in discussing the role of prisons: "It is
hard to train an aviator in a submarine." His colleague
Norval Morris then added : "It is even harder to predict his
fl ying capacity from observing his submarine behavior ."
In recent years. the sentencing commission has replaced
the parole board as the primary candidate for assuming
discretionary authority in sentencing. So far , no jurisdiction
has adopted the commission proposal, but Congress, in
particular. is giving it serious consideration. The
commission would be composed of a variety of persons with
something to contribute to sentencing-penologists,
lawyers. clergymen. sociologists, and perhaps, ex-convicts.
The function of the commission would not be to sentence in

each case. Rather, it would issue guidelines based upon
policies that it had developed. In many respects these
guidelines would be similar in form to the judicial
guidelines previously noted. The primary difference is that
th e commission's guidelines would be based on policies
formulated by the commission rather than policies
reflected in current sentences set by judges. To preserve
some flexibility , judges would be given limited discretion to
depart from the guidelines in exceptional cases . It is
anticipated, however, that the guidelines would be
controlling in 85-90 % of all cases. Departures from the
guidelines would be subject to appeal.
The supporters of the sentencing commission claim that it
would bring the following strengths to the sentencing
process: (1) greater uniformity in sentencing without loss of
flexibility; (2) centralization of policy-making authority in a
single body; and (3) greater professional expertise . Critics
raise the possibility that it too would lead to "robot
sentencing." They doubt that true individualization of
sentencing can be obtained by a weighted analysis of
variables. Actuaries may use that technique in setting life
insurance rates, but sentencing requires consideration of
too many intangibles. Only the judge who is close to the
case and the community, they argue, can appropriately
evaluate the sentencing needs of the particular offense and
offender .

Alternatives : Legislative Controls

Another group of critics of judicial discretion would like
almost to eliminate discretion altogether. Individualization,
they argue, is not a worthwhile objective . More emphasis
should be placed on uniformity and certainty of
punishment. In their view, the legislature should exercise
primary control over the sentence. This group favors
legislative classification of various crimes as nonprobationable. It also favors fairly tight legislative control
over the terms of imprisonment, as provided in the
California presumptive-determinate sentencing structure .
Opponents view this approach as reflecting an almost total
rejection of the rehabilitative goal. Moreover, they question
the legislature's capacity to properly assess sentences even
from the perspective of retribution and deterrence . The
legislature, they note, is too far removed from the criminal
justice process to set specific guidelines. If it miscalculates,
it is not in a position to make a quick adjustment. The
passage of new legislation is a time consuming process.
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